Is the latest ‘reconciliation’ between the feuding Palestinian factions any different to all the previous ones?
By Abdel Bari Atwan
I’m sure I’m not alone in being highly sceptical about the latest meetings held and agreements concluded by Fateh and Hamas – the two heavyweights of the Palestinian political scene – under Egyptian auspices in Cairo. This is not because of the scale of the challenges involved. It is because we have been here before on many occasions over the years, and because the level of trust between all concerned is extremely low.
Fateh and Hamas are both in internal turmoil and feel increasingly marginalized – on the Arab, international and domestic levels alike. They need to find a way out and stage a political and media comeback. So they have reverted to an old stratagem — albeit without any fresh ideas — to try to gain time without angering the Egyptian go-betweens, who both sides are eager to appease.
Much has changed since the first reconciliation agreement signed in Cairo in 2011. The Egyptian leadership has changed, as has the top man at Egyptian intelligence which is in charge of this dossier, with Gen. Khaled Fawzi taking over from the late Omar Suleiman. Hamas has changed too. It has elected a new political bureau, and a younger and tougher leadership within the Gaza Strip, which is unsullied by inter-Arab and even intra-Palestinian disputes.
The one thing that has not changed is the leadership of Fateh and the Palestinian Authority (PA).The same faces, the same approach, the same president, the same negotiators and the same denial.
One must concede, purely as an observer, that Hamas’ current leaders have proven to be far more pro-active and better at manoeuvring than their counterparts in Ramallah.
They rebuilt bridges with Egypt, and dealt a body-blow to Fateh by starting a dialogue with Egyptian-backed leadership contender Muhammad Dahlan and reaching understandings with him under Cairo’s auspices. At the same time, they rebuilt alliances with Iran and Hezbollah and washed their hands of all or most of the previous leadership’s Arab alliances, and are poised to restore ties with both Syria and some Gulf states.
In contrast, Fateh – and specifically the PA leadership – committed catastrophic blunders. It sought to compound the suffering of the two million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip as a way of punishing Hamas, but the move backfired disastrously, revealing both petulance and poor judgement in the decision-making process. The PA reduced electricity supplies to the enclave, cut the salaries of 60,000 public employees (most of them Fateh supporters), forced 6,000 into early retirement, and did its best to keep the Rafah crossing – the Gaza Strip’s only link to the outside world — closed.
But this neither weakened Hamas nor provoked residents into taking to the streets in protest against its rule. The move backfired, and drove Hamas into the arms of Dahlan, arch-rival of Fateh leader and president Mahmoud Abbas. By starting a dialogue with Dahlan it gained credit with his Egyptian sponsors and other like-minded Arab states, resulting in opening times being extended at the Rafah crossing and supplies of Egyptian fuel being sent to the Strip’s sole power station.
The PA leadership’s problem is that it is not sufficiently in touch with changes on the international and regional scene and within Palestinian society. It behaves in a high-handed and exclusionist manner, as though it still thinks it is as powerful and popular the PLO was in its heyday. While Hamas – which it accuses of being obscurantist and backward – has changed its leadership and political bureau via internal elections at least three times, Fateh’s ageing leaders and Central Committee members remain resolutely in place.
True, Abbas still holds the card of ‘legitimacy’. But the PA’s legitimacy is eroding fast thanks to the collapse of its main underpinning, the 24-year-old Oslo Accords, plus rampant Israeli colonization, waning popular support, and the transformation of the PA into a supplicant for international charity with suffocating strings attached.
The most recent opinion poll published in The Guardian newspaper suggests that if elections were held Hamas would win in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. But who can persuade Abbas and his Central Committee to believe this inconvenient fact, acknowledge the reality, and engage in a measure of self-criticism or revision?
The meetings between Hamas and Fateh resulted in some dramatic-sounding agreements. Hamas expressed its willingness to immediately dissolve its government (Administrative Council) in Gaza and hold elections to the PA presidency and legislature and also the Palestine National Council. It also agreed to restructure its security apparatus and hand all levers of power to a “government of national accord’ for an interim period pending the formation of a ‘government of national unity.’
But one can search all the documents and statements in vain for any reference to the PA ending security coordination with Israel, or of reactivating resistance in all its forms against the occupation, or reinstating stipends for Palestinian political prisoners in the occupation’s jails or rescinding salary cuts for employees in Gaza. No mention was made of any of these issues.
The Palestinians’ most important recent achievement was to force Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to abandon his plans to tighten Israeli security control over the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.This victory was achieved without the direct or indirect involvement of either Fateh or Hamas, or any of the other factions which are poised to engage in yet another round of headline-grabbing dialogues and reconciliations that make them feel relevant again.
This accurately and eloquently sums up the current condition of Palestinian politics.
They want us to take heart in the dissolution of the Gaza Administrative Council and at the sight of Hamas and Fateh representatives embracing, on the grounds that reconciliation is on its way. No problem, we will comply with their wishes. But how optimistic can we be, and how many weeks or months will it take? What are the practical mechanisms for implementing the agreements? How will the new government look? Will there be any guarantees of genuine reform in all sorts of areas, or that corruption will indeed be uprooted?
It is exhausting and painful to keep writing about these reconciliation meetings and agreements. It has become tedious due to constant repetition, and the difficulty of finding anything new to say. This applies equally to writers and readers. It is for this reason that Palestine has ceased to be the central cause of the Arab world, and petty Arab rulers feel free to lord it over the Palestinians and cosy up to the Israelis as their new protectors.
أربعة حراكات شعبيّة جديدة قد تُغيّر وجه مِنطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا ومُستقبلها.. أحد عشر سببًا تُميّزها عن سابِقاتها.. ما هي؟ ولماذا نُعوّل كثيرًا على الحِراك الجزائريّ الحاليّ تحديدًا؟
القمّة الثلاثيّة في القاهرة هل تعكِس الصّراع العربيّ الإيرانيّ على العِراق؟ ولماذا لا نستبعِد أن تُمهّد لعودة سورية إلى الجامعة العربيّة وتحالُف جديد يكسِر حدّة الاحتكار السعوديّ الخليجيّ على القرار العربيّ؟
بعد تهويد الجولان.. إسرائيل الكُبرى تتبلور بسرعة.. ترامب يتعامل معنا كقطيعٍ من الغنم ونحنُ نستحق ذلك.. نجاح نِتنياهو في الانتِخابات المُقبلة مُهِم لتطبيق صفقة القرن بتمويلٍ سعوديٍّ خليجيٍّ وإقامة الوطن البديل في الأردن.. أردوغان أدان ولكن هذا لا يكفي